

LA-UR-22-25192

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Title: A Proposal for Grading Plutonium Mixtures ANS Executive Panel
Entitled, "Not All Plutonium is Created Equal?"

Author(s): Bathke, Charles G.

Intended for: American Nuclear Society (ANS) Annual Meeting, 2022-06-12/2022-06-16
(Anaheim, California, United States)

Issued: 2022-06-22 (rev.1)



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A Proposal for Grading Plutonium Mixtures

ANS Executive Panel Entitled, “Not All Plutonium is Created Equal?”

Charles G. Bathke

6/13/2022



Managed by Triad National Security, LLC for the U.S. Department of Energy's NNSA

Outline

- This presentation will give:
 - A rationale for why all plutonium poses a safeguards and security risk
 - A proposal for providing some relief for plutonium mixtures, such as MOX, based on dilution

A Rationale for Why All Plutonium Poses a Safeguards and Security Risk

- An answer to why all plutonium metal poses a safeguards and security risk lies in bare critical mass (BCM)
- The reason BCM is relevant is:
 - NED fuel must be capable of going quickly from subcritical to supercritical to achieve nuclear yield
 - A material that has a BCM is called fissible
 - Fissible materials can be made to go from subcritical to supercritical
- Then, a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a material to be weapon usable is that it be fissible
 - All weapon usable materials are fissible
 - Not all fissible materials are weapon usable

A Rationale for Why All Plutonium Poses a Safeguards and Security Risk (cont'd)

- Next is a list of fissible isotopes with half-lives greater three years
 - Three years was chosen to eliminate isotopes with that are in very small concentration because of their short half-lives (e.g., ^{242}Cm)
- List of fissible isotopes
 - Is ordered by increasing BCM
 - Is then put into groups
 - Groups are anchored to IAEA's boundary between HEU and LEU, which is 20% ^{235}U which has a BCM of ~800 kg
 - Grouped by half decades in BCM (M)
 - $M < 8 \text{ kg}$
 - $8 < M < 25 \text{ kg}$
 - $25 < M < 80$
 - $80 < M < 250$
 - $250 < M < 800$
 - $800 < M$

List of Fissile Isotopes^a with Half-Lives > 3 years

Isotope	ρ (g/cc)	$\tau_{1/2}$ (y) ^b	Decay Mode ^b	Heating Rate (W/g)	M (kg)	Isotope	ρ (g/cc)	$\tau_{1/2}$ (y) ^b	Decay Mode ^b	Heating Rate (W/g)	M (kg)
M < 8 kg						25 < M < 80 kg					
²⁴³ Cm	13.51	29.1	α	$1.89(10)^0$	5.91	²⁴⁰ Pu	19.84	6561	α	$7.09(10)^{-3}$	37.29
²³² U	18.95	68.9	α	$6.87(10)^{-1}$	5.97	²³⁵ U	18.95	$7.04(10)^8$	α	$5.66(10)^{-8}$	46.33
²⁴⁹ Cf	15.1	351	α	$1.90(10)^{-1}$	6.85	²⁴⁶ Cm	13.51	4706	α	$1.01(10)^{-2}$	46.88
²³⁶ Np	20.45	$1.53(10)^5$	ϵ, β^-	$2.66(10)^{-5}$	7.14	²³⁷ Np	20.45	$2.14(10)^6$	α	$2.15(10)^{-5}$	58.75
8 < M < 25 kg						²⁴⁸ Cm	13.51	$3.48(10)^5$	α	$5.29(10)^{-4}$	63.32
²³⁸ Pu	19.84	87.7	α	$5.67(10)^{-1}$	8.18	²⁴¹ Am	13.69	432.6	α	$1.14(10)^{-1}$	66.70
²⁴⁷ Cm	13.51	$1.56(10)^7$	α	$2.96(10)^{-6}$	8.76	²⁴² Pu	19.84	$3.75(10)^5$	α	$1.13(10)^{-4}$	74.33
²³⁹ Pu	19.84	24110	α	$1.92(10)^{-3}$	9.98	80 < M < 250 kg					
²⁴⁸ Bk	14.79	> 9	α	$7.68(10)^{-2}$	10.02	²⁴⁴ Pu	19.84	$8.00(10)^7$	α	$5.14(10)^{-7}$	103.06
^{242m} Am	13.69	141	IT	0	10.88	²³⁴ U	18.95	$2.46(10)^5$	α	$1.80(10)^{-4}$	126.06
²⁴⁵ Cm	13.51	8423	α	$5.70(10)^{-3}$	11.93	²⁴³ Am	13.69	7370	α	$6.41(10)^{-3}$	178.23
²⁴¹ Pu	19.84	14.3	β^-	$3.19(10)^{-3}$	13.01	250 < M < 800 kg					
²⁵¹ Cf	15.1	898	α	$5.66(10)^{-2}$	14.31	²⁴⁷ Bk	14.79	1380	α	$3.59(10)^{-2}$	406.32
²³³ U	18.95	$1.59(10)^5$	α	$2.81(10)^{-4}$	15.22	800 kg < M					
²⁴⁴ Cm	13.51	18.1	α	$2.83(10)^0$	17.70	²⁵⁰ Cm	13.51	8300	SF, α	$6.01(10)^{-2}$	982.85
²⁵⁰ Cf	15.1	13.1	α	$4.06(10)^0$	18.33	²²⁹ Th	11.72	7932	α	$6.51(10)^{-3}$	29850.39

^a Using ENDF/B-VIII.0 cross sections

^b <http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/wallet/wccurrent.html>

^{233}U and ^{235}U Appear in Different Groups

Isotope	ρ (g/cc)	$\tau_{1/2}$ (y) ^b	Decay Mode ^b	Heating Rate (W/g)	M (kg)	Isotope	ρ (g/cc)	$\tau_{1/2}$ (y) ^b	Decay Mode ^b	Heating Rate (W/g)	M (kg)
M < 8 kg						25 < M < 80 kg					
^{243}Cm	13.51	29.1	α	$1.89(10)^0$	5.91	^{240}Pu	19.84	6561	α	$7.09(10)^{-3}$	37.29
^{232}U	18.95	68.9	α	$6.87(10)^{-1}$	5.97	^{235}U	18.95	$7.04(10)^8$	α	$5.66(10)^{-8}$	46.33
^{249}Cf	15.1	351	α	$1.90(10)^{-1}$	6.85	^{246}Cm	13.51	4706	α	$1.01(10)^{-2}$	46.88
^{236}Np	20.45	$1.53(10)^5$	ϵ, β^-	$2.66(10)^{-5}$	7.14	^{237}Np	20.45	$2.14(10)^6$	α	$2.15(10)^{-5}$	58.75
8 < M < 25 kg						^{248}Cm	13.51	$3.48(10)^5$	α	$5.29(10)^{-4}$	63.32
^{238}Pu	19.84	87.7	α	$5.67(10)^{-1}$	8.18	^{241}Am	13.69	432.6	α	$1.14(10)^{-1}$	66.70
^{247}Cm	13.51	$1.56(10)^7$	α	$2.96(10)^{-6}$	8.76	^{242}Pu	19.84	$3.75(10)^5$	α	$1.13(10)^{-4}$	74.33
^{239}Pu	19.84	24110	α	$1.92(10)^{-3}$	9.98	80 < M < 250 kg					
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^{245}Cm	13.51	8423	α	$5.70(10)^{-3}$	11.93	^{243}Am	13.69	7370	α	$6.41(10)^{-3}$	178.23
^{241}Pu	19.84	14.3	β^-	$3.19(10)^{-3}$	13.01	250 < M < 800 kg					
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^{250}Cf	15.1	13.1	α	$4.06(10)^0$	18.33	^{229}Th	11.72	7932	α	$6.51(10)^{-3}$	29850.39

^a Using ENDF/B-VIII.0 cross sections

^b <http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/wallet/wccurrent.html>

- The above grouping is consistent with the grouping of ^{233}U separate from ^{235}U in the US DOE Graded Safeguards Table (DOE O 474.2 Chg. 4) and the IAEA Categorization Table (INFCIRC/225/Rev 5)

^{238}Pu , ^{239}Pu , and ^{241}Pu Appear in ^{233}U Group, and ^{240}Pu and ^{241}Pu Appear in ^{235}U Group


Isotope	ρ (g/cc)	$\tau_{1/2}$ (y) ^b	Decay Mode ^b	Heating Rate (W/g)	M (kg)	Isotope	ρ (g/cc)	$\tau_{1/2}$ (y) ^b	Decay Mode ^b	Heating Rate (W/g)	M (kg)
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^a Using ENDF/B-VIII.0 cross sections

^b <http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/wallet/wccurrent.html>

- The above grouping is consistent with the grouping of Pu and ^{233}U together, but separate from ^{235}U in the US DOE Graded Safeguards Table (DOE O 474.2 Chg. 4) and the IAEA Categorization Table (INFCIRC/225/Rev 5)

What Does Pu from LWRs Look Like?



- Above results are the BCM (left), ^{238}Pu content (center), and ^{240}Pu content (right) of Pu in spent fuel as a function of burnup for various cooling times:
 - UOX refers to Pu obtained by processing spent UOX fuel
 - MOX refers to Pu obtained by processing spent MOX fuel (single recycle)
- According to “Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives,” DOE/NN-0007, pp. 37, 38, U.S. Department of Energy (1997), ^{238}Pu and ^{240}Pu are not an obstacle to nuclear explosives devices
- When separated, the plutonium from spent UOX and MOX has a smaller BCM than ^{235}U ; it is even in a more-attractive, lower-BCM group than ^{235}U and requires safeguards and security


The IAEA Has Provided a Way to Grade ^{235}U

- The IAEA Categorization Table contains three grades of ^{235}U :
 - $U < 10\% \text{ } ^{235}\text{U}$
 - $10\% \text{ } ^{235}\text{U} \leq U < 20\% \text{ } ^{235}\text{U}$
 - $U \geq 20\% \text{ } ^{235}\text{U}$


Material	Form	Category I	Category II	Category III ^c
2. Uranium-235 (^{235}U)	Unirradiated ^b <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Uranium enriched to 20% ^{235}U or more– Uranium enriched to 10% ^{235}U but less than 20% ^{235}U– Uranium enriched above natural, but less than 10% ^{235}U	5 kg or more	Less than 5 kg but more than 1 kg 10 kg or more	1 kg or less but more than 15 g Less than 10kg but more than 1 kg 10 kg or more

Proposal

- Invert EU BCM plot at right
- Select plutonium dilution grades that are equivalent in BCM to a set of enriched uranium grades
- For example, select IAEA HEU, HALEU, and LEU



Concentration/Enrichment (Wt. %)




Proposal (cont'd)

- Add BCM of a Pu isotopic vector (e.g., ^{239}Pu diluted with DU)

Concentration/Enrichment (Wt. %)

Min BCM Pu



Proposal (cont'd)

- Add BCM of a Pu isotopic vector (e.g., ^{239}Pu , ^{242}Pu , diluted with DU)

Concentration/Enrichment (Wt. %)

Max BCM Pu

^{242}Pu

99 80 57 52 46 39 36

Min BCM Pu

^{239}Pu
 ^{235}U

75

100 49

75 38

50 26

HEU

25 14

20 12


15 9

HALEU

10 6

8 5


LEU



Proposal (cont'd)

- Add BCM of a Pu isotopic vector (e.g., ^{239}Pu , ^{242}Pu , from SUOX burned to 30 MWd/kg and cooled 30 yrs diluted with DU)


Concentration/Enrichment (Wt. %)



Proposal (cont'd)


- Add BCM of a Pu isotopic vector (e.g., ^{239}Pu , ^{242}Pu , from SUOX burned to 30 or 50 MWd/kg and cooled 30 yrs diluted with DU)

Concentration/Enrichment (Wt. %)



Proposal (cont'd)

- Add BCM of a Pu isotopic vector (e.g., ^{239}Pu , ^{242}Pu , Pu from SUOX burned to 30 or 50 MWd/kg and cooled 30 yrs diluted with DU)



Caveats

- Even though Sect. 3.42. of the IAEA's INFCIRC/225/Rev 5 encourages a graded approach to physical protection, diluted plutonium is still considered direct use material by the IAEA's Safeguards Glossary (2001 Edition), Sect. 4.25
- Diluted plutonium is less attractive than undiluted plutonium, but **it is not proliferation resistant**
- Plutonium dilution does add an additional layer of protection as part of a defense in depth approach to safeguards and security
- Safeguards and security are still needed for IAEA direct use materials
- Plutonium diluted with DU differs significantly from either ^{233}U or ^{235}U diluted with DU
 - Diluted Pu requires processing
 - ^{233}U and ^{235}U diluted with DU require enrichment, which is much more difficult and energy intensive than processing

Conclusion

- This presentation provided:
 - A rationale for why all plutonium poses a safeguards and security risk
 - A proposal for providing some relief for plutonium mixtures, such as MOX, based on dilution
 - Determine plutonium concentration in a mixture that has the same bare critical mass as the desired uranium grade
 - Algorithm also applies to ^{233}U from spent thorium fuel